Client acceptance and continuation decisions by Asare, Stephen et al.
University of Mississippi 
eGrove 
Proceedings of the University of Kansas 
Symposium on Auditing Problems Deloitte Collection 
1-1-1994 
Client acceptance and continuation decisions 
Stephen Asare 
Karl Hackenbrack 
Robert W. Knechel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_proceedings 
 Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Auditing Symposium XII: Proceedings of the 1994 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas Symposium on 
Auditing Problems, pp. 163-178; 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Proceedings of the University of Kansas Symposium on Auditing Problems by an authorized 
administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
8 
Client Acceptance and Continuation Decisions* 
Stephen Asare 
Karl Hackenbrack 
W. Robert Knechel 
University of Florida 
Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a study designed to understand how auditors 
make client acceptance and continuation decisions. Descriptive evidence was gleaned 
from the professional literature, audit firm materials, and interviews with seven audit 
partners. Based on the evidence we present a framework that delineates the key activi-
ties in this area. Avenues for additional research are presented. 
Introduction 
Why do auditors accept some companies as audit clients but not others? What 
types of information do auditors use when making client acceptance decisions? Once 
a professional relationship has been established, under what circumstances will an 
auditor terminate the relationship? These and related client acceptance and continua-
tion issues have received limited attention in both the academic and professional 
literature. The decision to accept an audit client or continue a professional relationship 
with an existing client is important because an incorrect decision may directly affect 
the financial viability of an accounting practice. 
We interviewed seven practicing audit partners who are responsible for making 
client acceptance and continuation decisions and reviewed audit firm manuals and 
professional standards. This paper presents preliminary findings on the task structure, 
the decision process and its participants, their incentives, and the types and sources of 
available information that shape such decisions. Our effort is exploratory—to sketch 
some of the more important issues that are of interest and concern to practitioners and 
academics alike. Sometimes it will appear that we have raised more questions than we 
have answered. This is deliberate and follows from our goal of identifying key issues 
and stimulating further research. 
The next section delineates the motivation and presents background information. It 
is followed by a section that describes the interview method. Then the descriptive 
information on how auditors make client acceptance and continuation decisions is 
presented in a framework that emerged as we analyzed the interview results. The final 
section enumerates some research opportunities. 
Motivation and Background Information 
Our primary motivation is to understand the client acceptance decision process—in 
its naturalistic setting—from the perspective of practitioners. The paucity of research 
* The authors were supported by a summer research grant from the Fisher School of Accounting. 
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and the importance of the client acceptance decision, suggested an exploration of that 
decision environment. The crucial role of such exploration in theory building is aptly 
demonstrated by work on accountability (Emby and Gibbins 1988; Gibbins and 
Newton 1993). In this regard, this exploratory study responds to calls to give adequate 
consideration to the nature of audit tasks, as a prerequisite to evaluating auditors' 
judgments or formulating theories of audit judgment (Felix and Kinney 1982; Wright 
1987; Burgstahler and Sundem 1989; Trotman 1992). Second, we elaborate on the 
guidance included in the professional standards and academic literature (e.g., Huss 
and Jacobs 1991; Stice 1991) pertaining to information sources, reliability of 
evidence, relative importance of different types of evidence, and the extent of informa-
tion search. We explain why auditors evaluate evidence from various sources 
differently, and why under certain circumstances (e.g., lapse of time) a discovery of 
lack of integrity on the part of management will be discounted by an auditor. 
Professional guidance on client associations is provided in the Statements on 
Quality Control Standards (QC) section QC 10 and paragraphs QC 90.23-.24. These 
standards require that an audit practice establish procedures for evaluating prospective 
clients and for reviewing the continuation of ongoing relationships. For prospective 
clients, suggested procedures include (1) obtaining financial statements, (2) 
performing third-party inquiries, (3) communicating with predecessor auditors, (4) 
evaluating independence issues, and (5) reviewing pertinent regulatory rules. For 
existing clients, the emphasis should be on identifying and evaluating significant 
changes in client circumstances. Examples of significant changes include changes in 
management, ownership, legal counsel, financial status, litigation status, type of busi-
ness, and scope of engagement. Whether dealing with prospective or existing clients, 
the standards require that firms designate a person to be responsible for each decision, 
inform all personnel of firm policies, and emplace a system for monitoring compli-
ance. Finally, these standards indicate that "the auditor would not necessarily include 
all the examples or be limited to those illustrated." In effect, the auditor's judgment 
determines the nature and extent of client acceptance procedures. 
Audit firm policies and procedures reviewed tended to restate the professional stan-
dards but with emphasis on administration and provision of a paper trail of 
compliance. At some firms, a lengthy form must be completed, typically consisting of 
numerous yes/no questions and requiring additional explanation for the no answers. 
Other firms utilize open-ended questionnaires that allow the auditors to summarize 
their efforts and findings. Firms differ in the level of approval (e.g., office managing 
partner or regional partner) that is required for obtaining or continuing any given 
client relationship. While our initial review of firm manuals indicated firm differences, 
our interviews suggested that the apparent differences were matters of form rather 
than substance. Further, procedures that were not explicitly discussed in the manuals 
were routinely undertaken in the actual decision process depending on the circum-
stances of the prospective client being evaluated. Therefore, our first proposition is 
that research on inter-firm differences in client acceptance decisions is not a viable 
opportunity. As a corollary, we propose that inter-engagement differences are more 
worthwhile to study. 
Interview Method 
Seven partners representing four international accounting firms were interviewed 
in their respective offices located in the same major metropolitan area. Each interview 
lasted one to two hours. Two of the researchers were present for each interview. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured format that allowed the interviewee the latitude 
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to convey anecdotal evidence. Prior to the interview, each participant was provided an 
interview fact sheet that illustrated some of the issues to discuss (see exhibit 1). They 
were told, however, to add or to delete from the list at their discretion—in effect they 
described the decision process in whatever way they desired. None of the participants 
referred to this sheet during the interview. A l l interviews were taped and transcribed.1 
Partners were chosen because they are responsible for the client acceptance decisions. 
Interview Results 
Overview 
A content analysis of the interview transcripts suggests that there are four distinct 
phases—practice development, acceptance analysis, acceptance decision, continuation 
analysis—of the client acceptance and continuation decision process. Figure 1 is a 
framework based on this finding. It takes the form of a flow chart.2 The process starts 
with practice development. The purpose of practice development is to disseminate 
information about the services provided by the firm and thereby cultivate potential 
clients. Practice development is usually continuous and low-profile, although it may 
be aggressive at times when specific target companies are identified and actively cul-
tivated.3 Typical avenues for practice development include involvement in civic, 
business, charitable, and social organizations; advertising; high-profile engagements 
and personal contacts. Size of company, audit fee, prestige, exposure, opportunity for 
consulting, and timing of the work are among the engagement attributes that 
accounting firms consider when targeting prospective clients. Successful practice 
development provides opportunities for auditors to offer their services to prospective 
clients, often in the form of a proposal.4 
Figure 1 
Flowchart Of The Client Acceptance And Continuation Decision Process 
Practice 
Development 
Opportunity 
to propose 
Acceptance 
Analysis 
Audit 
Continuation 
Analysis 
1 Transcripts of the interviews are available upon request. 
2 The relationship between practice development, acceptance analysis, and acceptance decisions may not be 
strictly temporal as implied by Figure 1. 
3 Cultivation of prospective clients must be done within the limitations imposed by the Code of 
Professional Conduct and the applicable state laws. 
4 A proposal is not an engagement letter. We use the term "proposal" to indicate the process by which audi-
tors inform a potential client that they would like to make their services available. An engagement letter is a 
contract between the parties listing the duties and responsibilities of each. It is completed during the plan-
ning phase of an audit. 
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No 
Do not propose. Is client 
Yes 
Propose 
Exhibit 1 
Interview Fact Sheet 
The AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee is responsible for developing the profession's quality 
control standards. It has identified nine elements of quality control for a professional practice. One of these 
standards pertains to the acceptance and continuance of clients. The purpose of this interview is to gather 
general information on (1) the guidance the AICPA provides CPA firms on the client acceptance decision, 
(2) your firm's client acceptance policies and procedures, and (3) the application of these policies and 
procedures to individual engagements. 
For the purpose of this interview, the term business risk refers to the probability that your firm will 
suffer loss or injury to its practice as a result of providing professional audit services to a particular 
company. Examples of loss or injury include litigation, tarnished reputation, sanctions imposed by regula-
tory bodies, lack of profit, etc. 
1. We would like to begin the interview by having you describe the process that led to you, as the partner-
of-record (partner-in-charge), to accept your newest audit client. It may help to review the client 
acceptance documents in that company's permanent file as you reflect on the process. This walk-though 
should include a rather specific description of how the firm's formal (as documented in the audit 
manual) and informal policies and procedures were applied. 
a. What types of information and evidence did you gather in order to make the decision? 
b. How did you document your reasoning? 
c. Who participated in the process besides yourself? What role did each play? 
2. Assume for the moment that a prospective client had approached you about providing audit services. 
a. In general, what characteristics of a prospective client would indicate that it should be accepted? 
b. What characteristics would make you hesitate or think twice about accepting it? 
c. What types of audit engagements would your firm not accept or would be accepted only under 
special circumstances? What are those special circumstances? 
d. What would be the most likely reasons that you would ultimately decide not to accept a prospec-
tive client? 
e. If during an engagement you become aware of facts or circumstances that would have caused you 
not to accept the prospective client, what would you do? 
3. One of the procedures suggested by the Special Committee on Proposed Standards for Quality Control 
Policies and Procedures was to consider the "riskiness" of the engagement in accepting and planning 
an audit engagement (guidelines attached). Is the Committee referring to business risk as defined earlier 
in the interview? (use revised definition of business risk through the rest of the interview) 
a. How does your firm assess business risk? 
b. What types of evidence is used to assess the riskiness of a prospective client? 
c. How reliable is each type of evidence? 
4. Describe an engagement you would consider to have a "high" business risk. 
5. Describe an engagement you would consider to have a "low" business risk. 
6. In what ways is audit planning affected by these initial assessments of business risk? Is the planning or 
conduct of the audit any different for those engagements that are judged to have a "high" business risk 
as opposed to those that are judged to have a "low" business risk? 
7. To this point in the interview, we have discussed only client acceptance decisions. The quality control 
standards also apply to client continuation decisions. How does the client continuation decision differ 
from the client acceptance decision? 
8. In your opinion, does the "Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 1 — System of Quality Control 
for a CPA Firm" and the "Quality Control Policies and Procedures for CPA Firms" (both are attached) 
provide sufficient guidance in the area of client acceptance? Explain. 
9. Are your firm policies more strict, equally as strict, or less strict than those embodied in "Statement on 
Quality Control Standards No. 1 — System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm" and the "Quality 
Control Policies and Procedures for CPA Firms"? 
10. Are there any other issues related to the client acceptance decision that we have failed to address or that 
you would like to clarify or discuss further? 
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When presented with an opportunity to propose, the auditor performs a series of 
procedures that we refer to as acceptance analysis. The acceptance analysis may lead 
to a decision not to propose, and the process would then stop. Alternatively, if the 
analysis does not reveal any significant negative information about the prospect, the 
auditor will submit a proposal. Therefore, we propose that a noncompensatory deci-
sion is used, and rejection decisions are influenced solely by negative evidence (Beach 
and Frederickson, 1989; Asare and Knechel, 1992). The proposal is a verbal or written 
offer to provide services; i f accepted by the prospective client, it signifies the "go 
ahead" to perform the audit.5 
The final activity incorporated in the framework is the continuation analysis. Once 
the auditor has completed the audit engagement, a decision must be made whether to 
continue the relationship with the client. There are a number of reasons why an 
auditor might choose to discontinue an existing client relationship.6 Participants indi-
cated that, the decision to disassociate from a client involves consideration of 
information that becomes available during the course of the audit that would have 
caused the auditor not to propose in the first place if available at the time of the accep-
tance analysis.7 If the auditor (and the client) decide to continue their professional 
relationship, they wil l enter into an indefinite cycle of auditing the company and 
reviewing the relationship. The rest of this section is a detailed discussion of the activ-
ities in the four phases: (1) practice development and identification of potential 
clients, (2) acceptance analysis, (3) acceptance decisions, and (4) continuation 
analysis. 
Practice Development and Identifying Potential Clients 
This phase is probably the least discussed in either the professional or academic 
literature. Nonetheless, all the participants highlighted it as a crucial component of their 
client acceptance decision process. The main role of practice development is to identify 
the set of prospective clients available to the firm now and in the future. Participants 
suggested that not all potential clients are a target of the firms' practice development. 
Specifically, they identified three constraints that defined which clients to cultivate. The 
first constraint is imposed by the environment. Firms consider only those engagements 
that they can service in accordance with professional standards (e.g., independence 
issues) and regulatory and governmental restrictions (e.g., mandatory auditor switch). 
The second constraint is firm imposed. Clients must meet certain minimum firm stan-
dards before they wil l be considered worthwhile candidates for acceptance. Some 
companies may be omitted from consideration because they are in a high risk industry 
(e.g., casinos, savings and loans), are potentially unlawful (e.g., an importer of cut 
flowers from Colombia), or of questionable repute (e.g., a 900 telephone service or 
5 A proposal may be either formal or informal. For example, a governmental organization may have a legal 
obligation to follow a very formal process whereas an owner-managed business may have an informal 
process. 
6 Clients may also choose to discontinue the professional relationship with a firm on the basis of the ex post 
information that they possess after an engagement is complete. The client may consider the fees unreason-
able, may dislike the personnel assigned to the engagement, or feel that quality service was not forthcoming 
from the auditing firm. Whatever the reason for such a client-firm split, we have omitted this case from our 
analysis because we are primarily concerned with the factors that affect the auditor's decision process. 
7 The decision to resign from an engagement can be made at almost any time, even during the course of an 
unfinished audit. However, withdrawing before completing an audit is obviously an extreme response to 
extreme conditions, such as discovery of major financial fraud. For the purposes of this paper, we do not 
exclude those types of events, but we will emphasize the less extreme conditions that would allow the 
auditor to complete the engagement but then choose to discontinue the relationship. 
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adult bookstores). The third constraint is auditee imposed. Not only do some clients not 
solicit bids, but also they are not amenable to the possibility of hiring the firm. 
Practice development entails the management and coordination of these constraints. 
Based on our findings, Figure 2 presents a useful framework for considering firms' 
practice development efforts. Each point in the Venn diagram is an individual audit 
engagement. Within the rectangle is every audit engagement to be completed by all 
audit firms within a specified time period. The area labelled "allowable" represents all 
audit engagements a particular firm is permitted to serve in the next period. That is the 
area defined by the environmental constraints. The area labelled "target" represents all 
engagements that have no obvious disqualifying characteristics. That area is fixed by 
firm imposed constraints. Finally, the area labelled "available" represents all clients that 
consider the audit firm a suitable candidate to provide services during the next 
period—the auditee imposed constraint. This set includes current clients, first-time 
audit engagements, and companies open to an auditor switch. 
Figure 2 
Determination Of The Opportunity Set 
The intersection created by the three constraints is the set of engagements the firm 
will include in its current acceptance or continuation analysis. We call this the oppor-
tunity set. Our findings and the framework suggest several interesting propositions. 
First, both nonclients and current clients are members of the opportunity set. Second, 
the size and content of the opportunity set changes over time because the number of 
possible engagements satisfying each of the three constraints changes each period. 
Third, the firm can influence many of the factors that alter the composition of the 
opportunity set. For example, it can broaden its allowable set by acquiring the neces-
sary expertise to service specialized industries, firm philosophies and goals can 
change in such a way as to broaden or narrow the target market, and successful prac-
tice development may increase the number of available companies. Finally, based on 
practice development efforts, potential clients are classified as desirable, undesirable 
or unknown. Desirable companies are those that the firm is aware of and, unless 
evidence to the contrary surfaces, would like to serve. These potential clients are culti-
vated. Undesirable companies are those that the firm is aware of (either individually or 
as a class) but, for any number of reasons, prefers to avoid (that is, they are not in the 
target set in Figure 1). Unknown companies are those that the firm is unaware of but 
that approach the audit firm for possible services. This latter group includes most 
start-up enterprises and presents the biggest challenge in terms of acceptance deci-
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Available Allowable 
Target Opportunity 
Set 
sions. As described in the next section the extent of acceptance analysis is closely 
linked to this classification. 
Acceptance Analysis 
This phase is probably the most discussed in the professional literature. None-
theless, we unearthed several subtle issues. Acceptance analysis includes the activities 
undertaken by an audit firm to determine whether to submit a proposal. Seven key 
issues identified are: 
1. firm expertise and staffing, 
2. firm independence, 
3. client effect on firm reputation and image, 
4. client integrity, 
5. anticipated profitability of engagement, 
6. client financial status, and 
7. client accounting practices and control structure. 
The importance of each issue depends on whether the client is initially classified 
as, desirable, undesirable, or unknown. Table 1 summarizes some of the differences. 
Firm Expertise and Staffing: Professional standards highlight the importance of 
having the requisite expertise to handle a specific engagement. Presumably, i f the 
expertise is not present, a firm must turn down the prospective client. Many of the 
interviewees indicated that turning down work because of lack of expertise or 
adequate staff is rare since most staffing problems can be overcome by transferring 
personnel from other offices (in the short run) and by expanding recruiting efforts (in 
the long run). In some cases, the excuse that the accounting firm lacks expertise is 
offered as an explanation when the firm wants to refuse work for other, more 
derogatory reasons (e.g., the suspicion that the management lacks integrity). 
Firm Independence: G A A S requires that auditors maintain an independent 
attitude in both fact and appearance. A l l interviewees indicated that their firms had 
procedures for identifying potential independence problems. In some firms, 
independence is verified with a "negative confirmation." With this procedure, a list of 
clients is periodically distributed to all audit staff, but only those who have a conflict 
of interest with a client need respond. Other firms use a "positive confirmation;" the 
client list is made available to appropriate staff, who sign a form indicating that they 
are independent.8 Regardless of the system used, the interviewees felt independence 
problems caused by direct or indirect ownership interests can almost always be 
resolved. 
Client Effect on Firm Reputation and Image: A client can affect a firm's 
reputation. As one auditor stated, "We wouldn't want to be known as A l Capone's 
auditor." The issue of reputation goes beyond the possibility of adverse publicity from 
litigation.9 In assessing a potential client's effect on firm reputation, participants 
emphasized the need to evaluate the nature of the client's business or operations as 
8 One firm used a positive confirmation in the local office and a negative confirmation on a national basis. 
9 Wilson and Grimlund (1990), using SEC disciplinary actions as a surrogate for reputation effects, found 
that firms with bad reputations had their market share erode relative to other firms. Second tier firms (i.e., 
non-Big Eight) also had difficulty retaining clients when faced with SEC disciplinary action. Surprisingly, 
the same second-tier firms did not have a significant fall-off in their ability to attract new clients. 
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well as the reputation of the client's principal owners. For instance, a client may be 
turned down because the principal owners or managers have a negative reputation in 
the business community, and the firm may not want to be associated with that 
reputation. Auditors may also want to avoid companies in certain types of business 
because the overall reputation of the business is poor, e.g., adult book stores or penny 
stock schemes. 
Table 1 
Aspects of Acceptance Analysis 
Type of Potential Client 
Known, Desirable Known, Undesirable Unknown 
Expertise/ 
Staffing 
Exists or easily obtained via 
transfers or recruiting. 
Independence Rarely a problem. 
Reputation/ 
Image 
Integrity 
Profitability 
Financial 
Status 
Accounting 
Practices 
Predetermination usually made 
that this will be a positive 
effect which must be rebutted 
by contrary information. 
Predetermination usually made 
that this is unlikely to be a 
problem. Opinion may be 
changed by further 
information received during 
review but extent of review 
will be limited. 
Often pro forma consideration, 
as prospective client is 
assumed to be willing to pay 
reasonable fees and business 
risk is not a major concern. 
Ex post evaluation is more 
important. 
Often pro forma consideration 
since companies having 
financial difficulties are 
easily identified. 
May be a problem in certain 
industries. Firms may 
need to discuss their strong 
opinions with the prospective 
client. Control structure is 
rarely a problem. 
Lack of expertise may be used Will try to obtain if client 
as excuse to avoid turns out to be desirable. 
undesirable clients. 
Not pertinent. 
Predetermination usually made 
that this will be a negative 
effect that is difficult to 
rebut. 
Typically a major reason why 
the client is not desirable. 
Requires extensive rebuttal 
to overcome preconceptions. 
Not pertinent. No fee is 
high enough. 
May be a major reason why 
the client is not desirable. 
Not pertinent. 
Family relationships are more 
likely to be a problem. 
Will try to evaluate this with 
extensive research and 
investigation. Interpersonal 
references, media research, 
review of legal documents and 
client discussions may all be 
performed. Key concerns 
center on nature of business 
operations and reputation of 
management. 
Will try to evaluate with 
extensive research and 
investigation. (See 
"Reputation.") Also 
concerned with competence of 
management. 
Fees may be very important 
consideration. Can the 
client afford the work that 
is necessary to issue an 
opinion, given their records 
and control structure? Will 
the client grow and expand 
its demands for services? Is 
engagement timing beneficial 
to firm? Should fees be paid 
in advance? 
Important consideration since 
one-year clients are not desirable. 
Firm often concerned with 
competence of management, 
under-capitalization, nature of 
product and service, and 
existence of sound business plan. 
May be a problem in certain 
industries. Firms may need 
to discuss their strong 
opinions with the prospective 
client. Control structure 
may be a problem. 
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To assess possible reputation effects, auditors often search media sources, e.g., 
LEXIS, for news about the company, its owners, and its managers. Additionally, firms 
often contact existing clients as a matter of courtesy. This is particularly important if 
the prospective and existing clients are direct competitors, e.g., Coke and Pepsi. The 
existing client may object to the prospective client, and most firms are not willing to 
upset long-standing professional relationships for the sake of obtaining a new client. 
However, this is not always a problem because companies want to hire the "best" firm 
for their type of business. This often means that the "best" accounting firm is also 
auditing one or more of their competitors. The trade-off of confidentiality against 
industry expertise depends on the number of competitors in an industry or geographic 
region. Therefore, we propose that, the less concentrated an industry, i.e., the greater 
the number of direct competitors, the greater the willingness of companies to hire an 
accounting firm that does work for a competitor. 
Management Integrity: Without question, assessing management integrity was 
the biggest specific concern of the interviewees. In fact, the majority of procedures 
identified and discussed by the interviewees directly related to assessing management 
integrity. The focus of most client investigations is to try to determine if the client's 
management is trustworthy. Assessing management integrity involves communicating 
with management as well as with those familiar with management. If the auditor feels 
that the management is less than completely candid, uncomfortable feelings may exist 
about the accounting practices and procedures of the company. A "hard-nosed but 
honest businessman" or an "individual with the habit of suing for every imagined 
slight" would also be difficult to deal with; in these situations, taking on the client 
may not be worth the trouble. 
The interviewees identified many routine sources of references for prospective 
clients. For example, attorneys are routinely contacted. Information received from the 
current counsel of the client "must be carefully interpreted, however, since attorneys 
are hesitant to say anything negative about their clients." Other sources of reference 
are bankers, stockbrokers, ex-employees of the company, alumni of the accounting 
firm, business acquaintances of the company's management, other clients, colleagues 
in the firm (especially tax and consulting personnel), and mutual friends. Bankers are 
regarded as having a high reputation relative to attorneys. This finding, suggests that 
holding constant the information content of evidence, information obtained from 
bankers will be considered more reliable that those from attorneys. Availability of reli-
able references depend on the business environment. For instance, reliable references 
are difficult to obtain in a business environment where there are many transient entre-
preneurs or much foreign investment. 
Where such routine sources are lacking, participants stressed the use of more 
rigorous and formal investigations. They may review recent financial statements for 
obvious incongruities,10 obtain a Dun & Bradstreet report on the company, check with 
the SEC for complaints, review arrest records, or hire an investigation service. If these 
investigations reveal anything of importance, management is usually given the oppor-
tunity to respond or explain. One participant, recalled an investigation which revealed 
that a member of top management was a subject of criminal investigations several 
years ago. As explained by that participant, "transgressions that are ancient history do 
not help, but they sure are not fatal flaws." One partner indicated that he does not use 
1 0 One interviewee related a story of a retailer who had an inventory turnover ratio of one. The client was 
turned away because the auditor felt that there was probably something questionable going on in the business. 
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investigation services because, if he feels that uncomfortable about the potential 
client, he would simply choose not to propose. Attitude toward using investigation 
services, did not seem to be influenced by firm affiliation. 
The final source of information that was frequently mentioned was the predecessor 
auditor (when one existed). Communication between predecessor and successor audi-
tors is required by SAS 7. Auditors are usually fairly forthcoming, even when being 
replaced by another firm, because they realize that they may someday be on the other 
side. Contrary to SAS No. 7, however, formal communications may not always occur 
or may occur after the client has been accepted. SEC Form 8K filings, which detail 
the circumstances of an auditor change, are not always informative either. 
Anticipated Profitability of Engagement: The interviewees suggested that 
virtually all engagements result in little or no profit in the first year (i.e., lowballing). 
In submitting a proposal, firms focus not on first-year profits but rather on the 
prospect for future profits from repeat engagements and on opportunities for spin-off 
work, such as tax or consulting. Alternatively, i f most of the work can be performed at 
a time when staff are unassigned, the fees from the engagement may help cover some 
of the firm's fixed costs. 
Client Financial Status: The participants indicated that they are not interested in 
accepting a client who is on the verge of bankruptcy since such cases tend to end up in 
costly litigation and high up-front costs cannot be recouped. Accordingly, the client's 
financial status is thoroughly assessed prior to proposing. This does not mean that 
companies in financial difficulty are totally avoided. Auditors also evaluate 
management plans for dealing with the identified difficulties. In such situations, the 
key questions become: Is the business legitimate and does the product or service make 
sense? Is management competent and honest? Does the company have a reasonable 
business plan? Is undercapitalization the main cause of the company's difficulties? 
Although not interested in short-term clients, accounting firms stand to gain much 
from start-up companies with a reasonable plan because these may eventually require 
more accounting services. 
Client Accounting Practices and Control Structure: A key concern that auditors 
often address early in the decision process is whether the prospective client is 
auditable. As used here, auditability refers to whether the client's accounting practices 
and control structure are conducive to accurate and complete record-keeping. The 
interviewees indicated that they would be wary about submitting a proposal to 
management that had disagreed with its previous auditors on questions of accounting 
principles. This is especially true if the previous auditor was a "Big 6". 
Acceptance Decisions 
"Most of the (acceptance) decisions are fairly easy" and "95 percent (of the time 
we) are going to accept the client—it's a matter of documenting what we are doing" 
were comments made by audit partners interviewed. Auditors want to "get to yes." 
Turning away a client is a difficult choice for many to make since successful 
recruiting of clients is one criterion often used to judge the promotability of a manager 
to partner or to determine a partner's share of profits. But even the most aggressive 
auditor realizes that there are significant risks associated with accepting some compa-
nies as clients. Consequently, little negative evidence is needed to reject the client. 
This suggests that auditors can be characterized as "hungry" yet cautious. Being 
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hungry, the auditor adopts the operating hypothesis that all prospective clients are 
acceptable. However, because the auditor is cautious, very little negative evidence is 
required for this hypothesis to be abandoned. Asare and Knechel (1992) have tested 
and found support for this proposition. 
Continuation Analysis 
The decision to continue or terminate a professional relationship is similar to the 
decision to accept a client, but the sources of information for the decisions differ. 
After completing an engagement, the accounting firm has more information upon 
which to base its decision. This suggests that external sources of information, such as 
business or legal references, are less important when the firm has extensive first-hand 
information. The three key issues that auditors consider when deciding to continue a 
professional relationship are: 
1. Changes in client circumstances that are related to issues considered during the 
acceptance analysis, 
2. Audit results and status of client relations, 
3. Actual profitability. 
The interviewees indicated that a problem would need to be significant before most 
firms would resign. 
Significant Changes in Client Characteristics: Auditors cannot accept a client 
and then close their eyes to circumstances that might have caused rejection if 
previously known. Many of the interviewees indicated that the criteria they use for 
deciding to continue a client are the same as for accepting a client. The instances of 
disassociating from a client for reasons of reputation, financial status, expertise, or 
lack of independence are fairly rare; firms do a good job with their acceptance 
analysis in these areas. Issues related to management integrity are more likely to pose 
a problem since the auditor now has inside information about key management. For 
example, one interviewee related a case where he resigned because the president had 
been convicted of tax fraud even though the case did not involve the company. 
Audit Results and Client Relations: The performance of the audit wil l reveal 
information that is relevant to the continuation decision and may lead to conflict 
between the auditor and the firm personnel or management. Situations involving 
voluminous related-party transactions, client-imposed scope limitations, and 
accounting disagreements that cannot be satisfactorily or amicably resolved may lead 
auditors to conclude that they should withdraw from the client. Other situations may 
be more subtle, such as when management ignores management letter comments or 
when the control structure is deteriorating. The interviewees indicated that they would 
withdraw from an engagement if they are frequently at loggerheads with management, 
which may occur even i f the engagement is an otherwise profitable endeavor. 
Profitability: After an audit has been performed, the firm is able to analyze 
whether the engagement was profitable. Fees, costs, and expenses are all known with 
relative certainty at that point. The mechanism for determining profitability is the 
realization rate, computed by dividing the total fees collected for the job by the man-
hours employed. This rate is then compared to the "official" billing rates of the audit 
team. A job that is operating at less than 80 percent realization is being billed at a 
substantial discount. Realization rates in the first, and even second, year of an 
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engagement may be relatively low. The consensus of the interviewees was that 
realization should be close to 100 percent by the fourth year. Otherwise, the 
relationship wi l l be terminated unless there are extenuating circumstances for 
continuing to discount the job.11 
Research Opportunities 
Throughout the paper, we have identified testable propositions. In this section we 
will link some of our findings to the academic literature with a view to identifying 
more research issues. The unifying theme of this section is business risk. Business risk 
is the likelihood that an accounting firm will suffer a loss due to its association with an 
audit client in spite of complying with professional standards.12 Such losses include 
lawsuits, inadequate profits, and damage to a firm's reputation. Business risk may be 
best controlled by careful selection of the firm's clients.13 The interview results indicate 
that the purpose of the acceptance or continuation analysis is to assess the business risk 
associated with a current or prospective client. The purpose of this section is to illus-
trate how the client acceptance framework developed in this paper can be used to 
generate research questions. Table 2 presents a sample of specific questions. 
Business Risk: How Is It Assessed? 
The discussion of acceptance analysis indicates that auditors use many types and 
sources of information to assess business risk. No prescriptive or descriptive research 
has directly addressed the selection, weighing, or integration of the information avail-
able to assess business risk. However, several observations on how business risk is 
assessed and issues for further research are evident from the interview results. Table 2 
enumerates six questions related to this topic. 
First, the relative importance of cues and the information evaluation strategies of 
auditors when assessing business risk are areas amenable to research. Auditors weigh 
differently the relative importance of the seven types of information discussed in 
Section 4.2 when assessing business risk. For instance, the interview results suggest 
that auditor independence and firm expertise and staffing are directly controllable by 
the audit firm and should play only a limited role when auditors assess business risk. 
Of the factors that are not directly controllable by the auditor, management integrity 
and the client's financial status are the most important in the business risk decision. 
Further, these two factors may be evaluated configurally. If management integrity is 
low, the assessed level of business risk is likely to be high regardless of the client's 
financial status. But i f management integrity is high, the assessed level of business 
risk is directly related to the client's financial status. 
The information used to assess business risk comes from many sources, particu-
larly in acceptance analysis situations. The interview results indicate that information 
from current counsel is scrutinized closely, while information from bankers is consid-
ered very reliable. The credence attached to the predecessor auditor's communication 
appears to be affected by the reasons for the auditor switch. Thus, issues related to the 
11 Simon and Francis (1988) reported evidence that indicated fee cutting amounted to 24% in a new engage-
ment and 15% in years 2 and 3 of an engagement, with full fees being received by the fourth year of an 
engagement. 
1 2 Section AU 312.02, footnote 2, acknowledges the existence of this risk without giving it a specific name. 
1 3 Business risk is different from, and subsumes, the concept of audit risk (which represents the likelihood 
that the auditor will issue an incorrect audit report). Audit risk is controllable by the auditor via proper audit 
planning and compliance with professional standards. 
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effect of source reliability on business risk assessments is an area with research 
opportunities. 
Information search strategy is an important facet of the client acceptance analysis. 
The process can be quite costly, and investigation costs cannot be passed on to the 
client i f the latter is not accepted. Many factors can be expected to influence the infor-
mation search process, e.g., the economic outlook or whether the client is planning an 
initial public offering. The interview results indicate that the amount of information 
gathered varies considerably across engagements. The acceptance/continuation deci-
sion process is a context in which research on information search strategies is needed. 
Table 2 
Research Opportunities 
Business Risk: How is it Assessed? 
1. To what extent does the relative importance of the seven acceptance analysis issues 
vary with the classification of the prospective client in the practice development 
phase? 
2. Are business risk assessments influenced by auditor-specific factors such as a sense 
of professional responsibility and individual motivations? 
3. Given the same facts and circumstances, will the business risk assessment differ 
depending upon whether the potential auditee is a prospective or continuing client? 
4. What is the relationship between audit risk and business risk? How does informa-
tion obtained during the screening of clients affect audit planning? 
5. To what extent does a Firm's audit technology influence the assessment and mini-
mization of business risk? 
6. Are auditors well calibrated as to their ability to assess and control business risk? 
Business Risk: Whose Preferences Prevail? 
1. How effective are firm policies (or the partnership agreement) in providing effi-
cient risk sharing among auditor partners? 
2. Should firms allocate a greater portion of insurance liability premiums to higher 
risk clients? If so, how? 
3. How is the business risk of a firm affected by clients inherited through firm merger 
activities? 
4. Are auditors on repeat engagements willing to accept a higher (lower) level of 
business risk than would be accepted on a new engagement? 
5. To what extent does the possibility of spin-off work (e.g., consulting and tax) affect 
an auditor's tolerance of business risk? 
Business Risk: How is Audit Pricing Affected? 
1. How do business risk assessments affect pricing decisions? 
2. Does the classification of a prospective client during the practice development 
phase affect the extent of lowballing? 
3. Does a firm's tolerances of business risk affect their market position? 
4. Under what conditions should auditors use fixed fee versus cost plus contracts for 
pricing audit engagements? 
5. What influence do restrictions on practice development (e.g., advertising and solic-
iting) have on the opportunity set of potential clients and, ultimately the pricing of 
audit services? 
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Finally, the relationship among business risk, audit risk and audit planning needs to 
be unravelled. Preliminary evidence suggests that evidence obtained during the client 
acceptance process is used to reduce audit testing (Huss and Jacobs 1991; 
Hackenbrack and Knechel 1994). The pervasiveness and the appropriateness of such a 
strategy remains unknown. 
Business Risk: Whose Preferences Prevail? 
Although a firm may have a particular risk tolerance at a conceptual level, the 
actual business risk assessments are made at the office level and, within an office, at 
the individual partner level. Partners have different risk tolerances. For instance, newly 
promoted partners may pursue risky engagements more aggressively than would 
established partners. Partners who have recently been involved in litigation may be 
more conservative than they otherwise would be, reducing their risk tolerance. The 
diversity of such tolerances means that client acceptance decisions made by individ-
uals (or within local offices) may not coincide with the overall objectives of the firm. 
This observation has important implications for research that assumes a single set of 
risk preferences for decision making (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1990). 
Firms adopt a number of policies and procedures that are intended to reduce such 
variations in individual risk tolerances and, ultimately, client acceptance decisions. 
Examples include senior partner reviews and the use of standardized client acceptance 
checklists. At this point further research is needed to ascertain how effective these 
techniques are. 
Partially tempering these individual differences is the strong sense of partnership 
responsibility and duty to the accounting profession that was expressed by the part-
ners interviewed for this paper. Personal integrity, professional ethics, and interactions 
with peers would all contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of firm policies and 
procedures. The role these intangibles play in the individual partner's risk/return 
trade-off decisions is an important area for future research. Five questions related to 
this topic are listed in table 2. 
Business Risk: How Is Audit Pricing Affected? 
Auditors cannot simply choose companies to add to their client base. They must 
bid against their competitors for the opportunity to serve a particular company. 
Consequently, auditors' acceptance/continuation decisions subsume an assessment of 
the minimum fee they are willing to accept.14 The interview results indicate that these 
business risk and bidding decisions are not made in isolation. Rather, they involve 
comparing the net benefit that can be obtained by adding the company to its current 
client base. From this "portfolio" perspective, the decision to add a client to the firm's 
client base is based on the explicit consideration of its riskiness in relation to existing 
clients. Consequently, business risk plays an important role in an auditor's audit 
pricing strategy (see also, Simon 1985; Simon and Francis 1988; Simunic 1980). 
Prior research indicates that auditors use either a fixed fee or a cost-plus contract to 
price their audit (Palmrose 1989) and a tendency toward lowballing exists on some 
initial engagements (DeAngelo 1981; Turpen 1990). The conditions under which 
1 4 Simunic and Stein (1990) argue that the minimum bid level will include a recovery of direct costs, a 
recovery of opportunity costs, and a premium based on the perceived risk of the engagement. Simunic and 
Stein also argue that commonalities such as "client industry, geographic location and types of accounting 
principles" (p. 332) cause returns across audit engagements to be correlated. We would add the firm's audit 
technology to this list also. As a result of these commonalities, the decision to add a client to the firm's client 
base should be based on the explicit consideration of the return, risk, and covariation with existing clients. 
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either type of contract is used is not well understood, nor is it clear why auditors 
lowball on some engagements but not others. The interview results indicate that one 
possible explanation is auditors are more willing to use a fixed fee arrangement or 
lowball in situations of low business risk. Additional research that examines the rela-
tionship between lowballing or bidding strategies and business risk is needed.15 
Accounting firms will also assess business risk differently in similar situations 
because they have different cost and revenue functions. The cost of performing an 
audit can be expected to vary across firms with different audit technologies (Cushing 
and Loebbecke 1986), industry specialization (Eichenser and Danos 1981) or percep-
tions of the audit risks of the client at the global, account, or assertion levels. These 
variations directly affect the extent of audit effort necessary to obtain reasonable 
assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatements. 
The revenue a firm can expect to collect on an engagement will also vary across 
firms and wi l l depend on such factors as the firm's attitude toward lowballing 
(DeAngelo 1981; Schatzberg 1990), fee cutting (Simon and Francis 1988; Ettredge 
and Greenberg 1990; Turpen 1990), and their ability to generate spin-off work in 
consulting or tax (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986; Abdel-Khalik 1990). To the extent 
that these differences occur, firms will have different assessments of business risk and 
their bids wil l differ. The extent to which the cost and revenue functions of firms 
affect business risk assessments and audit pricing strategies is an important area for 
future research. We enumerate five research questions related to this topic. 
Concluding Remarks 
On the basis of a review of the professional literature, audit firm materials, and 
interviews with audit partners, we presented evidence on how auditors make client 
acceptance and continuation decisions. Our approach was driven by the lack of prior 
research, and has identified a number of research issues with practical significance. 
Auditors' assessments of management integrity is potentially the most rewarding area 
for further research. The dynamics of the client acceptance process and planning judg-
ments as well as the relative importance of the various information sources identified 
in professional standards are fertile research avenues. Conversely, inter-firm differ-
ences in client acceptance decisions does not appear to be a viable opportunity (cf. 
Huss and Jacobs 1991). 
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